... where consciousness as awareness isn't, for example, reconcilable re the first person singular "I said" (e.g. subjective experience - what you say, feel, think, and remember etc) and third person singular "she he it observed and said" perspectives (e.g. what scientists, neurologists, brain scientists study, measure and model) ...
and could we begin to explore these questions of how consciousness works anew in a realistic virtual earth for brain science ... am thinking Google Streetview with time slider / Maps / Earth / Brain / Translate with Tom Dean's brain modeling (since he's already working within the Google Stanford I.T. platforms) ...
4. Automatically Inferring Meso-scale Models of Neural Computation
https://youtu.be/HazJ7LHihG8
... and at the atomic and cellular levels with an algorithm of quantum computing approach ... and by building out / making ...
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And, I find it fascinating how communication itself can expand one's understanding of consciousness
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A way into consciousness questions, especially this image ... (and my idea: put networking video camera computers on neurons or cells (and vision related too) inside the head/in the brain - re awareness and subjectivity questions?)
Lovely reflection on how science fiction ‘conquered the world’
“We create an immersive simulation of the future that we can all experience and look back on, so that we might decide together whether we want these dreams to come true after all.”
Lovely reflection on how science fiction ‘conquered the world’— Ross Dawson (@rossdawson) March 16, 2019
“We create an immersive simulation of the future that we can all experience and look back on, so that we might decide together whether we want these dreams to come true after all.”https://t.co/Om18u1kKdw
- https://twitter.com/rossdawson/status/1106775106989129729
Pipe these data from cell cameras (associated with the vision process, for light in the brain?) into a realistic virtual earth - so such cameras could stream data
David Chalmers - Actual-Virtual Stanford philosophy talk (see blog entry here - https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/2017/05/wandering-albatross-talk-on-virtual-and.html) ...
Li (Stanford's Dr. Li Jiang from Design Group, Mechanical Engineering) - images which are viewed can also be seen somewhat in neural processing (see blog entry here - https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/2019/02/elaeis-guineensis-bright-red-oil-palm.html) ...
And how best to engage questions of how consciousness as awareness works further with brainwave headsets (https://scott-macleod.blogspot.com/2013/01/flower-coral-brainfingers-hands-free.html)
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Perhaps a network of cameras on neural cells ... into a Google centric realistic virtual earth (thinking Google Streetview with TIME SLIDER / TensorFlow / Translate) ... with humans sharing their subjective in language as a brain model for sharing / getting at the "what it is like to be a bat" crux per Thomas Nagel:
"Nagel's point is that there is a constraint on what it is to possess the concept of a mental state, namely, that one be directly acquainted with it. Concepts of mental states are only made available to a thinker who can be acquainted with his/her own states; clearly, the possession and use of physical concepts has no corresponding constraint."
Thomas Nagel
Philosophy of mind[edit]
What is it like to be a something[edit]
Nagel is probably most widely known within the field of philosophy of mind as an advocate of the idea that consciousness and subjective experience cannot, at least with the contemporary understanding of physicalism, be satisfactorily explained using the current concepts of physics. This position was primarily discussed by Nagel in one of his most famous articles: "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974). The article's title question, though often attributed to Nagel, was originally asked by Timothy M.B. Sprigge. The article was originally published in 1974 in The Philosophical Review, and ...
In "What is it Like to Be a Bat?", Nagel argues that consciousness has essential to it a subjective character, a what it is like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[12] His critics[who?] have objected strongly to what they see as a misguided attempt to argue from a fact about how one represents the world (trivially, one can only do so from his own point of view) to a false claim about the world, that it somehow has first personal perspectives built into it. On that understanding, Nagel is a conventional dualist about the physical and the mental. This is, however, a misunderstanding[according to whom?]: Nagel's point is that there is a constraint on what it is to possess the concept of a mental state, namely, that one be directly acquainted with it. Concepts of mental states are only made available to a thinker who can be acquainted with his/her own states; clearly, the possession and use of physical concepts has no corresponding constraint.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Nagel
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(Timothy Sprigge
Long concerned with the nature of experience and the relationship between mind and reality, Sprigge was the philosopher who first posed the question made famous by Thomas Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat?"[1] Throughout his career he argued that physicalism or materialism is not only false, but has contributed to a distortion of our moral sense. The failure to respect the rights of human beings and non-human animals is therefore largely a metaphysical error of failing to grasp the true reality of the first person, subjective perspective of consciousness, or sentience. The practice of vivisection, which gained wide acceptance with Descartes' view of animals as machines, would be an example of this failure. He was an advocate of animal rights and defended an environmental ethic.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy_Sprigge)
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"What it is like. Thomas Nagel's (1974) famous“what it is like” criterion aims to capture another and perhaps more subjective notion of being a conscious organism. According to Nagel, a being is conscious just if there is “something that it is like” to be that creature, i.e., some subjective way the world seems or appears from the creature's mental or experiential point of view. In Nagel's example, bats are conscious because there is something that it is like for a bat to experience its world through its echo-locatory senses, even though we humans from our human point of view can not emphatically understand what such a mode of consciousness is like from the bat's own point of view."
(See, too, 4 other related "2.1 Creature Consciousness" questions - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/).
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